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GILBERT L. FINNELL, JR.*
Intergovernmental Relationships
in Coastal Land Management-
All levels of government have interests in effective management of
coastal lands and should have a voice in deciding how coastal lands will
be used. This article discusses the tensions among federal, state, and
local governments for control over coastal land management, and argues
that, to the extent feasible, primary responsibility for coastal land planning
and regulation should be kept at the lowest level of government.
First, the article delineates the sources of regulatory power. Second,
it traces the legislative and administrative evolution of California's and
Florida's coastal programs and discusses recent judicial responses, par-
ticularly in Florida. Third, an analytic framework is proposed for assessing
coastal land management arrangements, concluding that California's and
Florida's strong reliance on local governments is sound public policy.
California and Florida provide an instructive comparison because, al-
though the two states have similarities, each being a major, diverse growth
state, they initially experimented with different approaches to institutional
reform. In some respects, however, their approaches have converged.
Both states continue to assign major planning and regulatory roles to local
governments, but both maintain a state and regional framework for mon-
itoring the extraterritorial effects of local governmental decisions.
THE FEDERAL ROLE
Historically, the federal government has had a major role in regulation
of coastal activities. Until recently it restricted its regulation of sea coasts
primarily to activities affecting "navigable" bodies of water.' Accord-
ingly, states and their delegates were responsible for regulating areas
*Professor of Law, University of Houston.
tParts of this article are taken verbatim, with permission, from the author's article, Coastal Land
Management:An Introduction, 1978 AM.B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 153; The Federal Regulatory Role
in Coastal Land Management, 1978 AM. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 169; Coastal Land Management
in California, 1978 AM. B. FouND. RES EARCH J. 647; and Coastal Land Management in Florida,
1980 AM. B. FouND. RESEARCH J. 303 (1980). (c) 1978, 1980, American Bar Foundation.
1. Navigability has different meanings in varying legal contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Holt
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926) (title to beds underlying navigable waters); In re Garnett, 141
U.S. 1, 11, 15 (1891) (admiralty jurisdiction). For a discussion of the different meanings in the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, see Finnell,
The Federal Regulatory Role in Coastal Land Management, 1978 AM. B. FouND. REsEARcI J. 169,
179-98 [hereinafter cited as Federal CLM 1.
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landward of such jurisdictional boundaries as "mean high tide line." 2
Recently, however, the federal regulatory role, both direct and indirect,
has increased dramatically.
Several recent trends are noteworthy. Federal-state concurrent juris-
diction has increased, and there is more sharing of power in the same
geographical area.3 A stronger federal role has emerged in areas previously
considered primarily, if not solely, within the jurisdiction of state and
local governments .' Federal power is asserted through grants to the states
through programs such as the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
(CZMA)5 and through direct regulatory programs based on the commerce
power.6 The existing and emerging federal-state models are having a
significant influence on the design of state-local programs.' Through the
"consistency clause" of the CZMA, states have gained leverage over
federal activity in coastal areas if the state's management program meets
federal standards.'
History, law, and experience have shown that the commerce clause
empowers Congress to enact comprehensive land planning and regulatory
programs in the entire coastal zone; indeed, if Congress so chooses, the
commerce and supremacy clauses empower Congress to preempt coastal
land management entirely.9 Nevertheless, Congress should be reluctant
to expand its existing direct regulatory role in the coastal zone. Instead,
Congress should continue to encourage state and local governments to
enact coastal land management programs through grant-in-aid programs
2. See generally United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976)
(recognizing general application of such boundaries but denying any claim that regulation beyond
these boundaries is precluded). See also Federal CLM, supra note 1, at 182, 185-86.
3. Two examples of federal regulatory programs in which state regulation is still allowed are the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7642 (1982), and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as
amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). This article discusses
how Congress intends that, generally, there will be federal-state concurrent jurisdiction in the field
of coastal land management.
4. Cf. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1641 (1982); and the Section
404 program of the Clean WaterAct, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). For a brief sketch of the administrative,
judicial,and congressional responses to the expansion of the Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, see generally Federal CLM, supra note 1, at 190-98.
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982).
6. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are direct regulatory programs based on the
commerce power. For the potential land use control aspects of these acts, see Federal CLM, supra
note 1.
7. As this article discusses, infra, whether the relationship is state-local, as in the California and
Florida land management programs, or federal-state, as in the federal environmental programs, e.g.,
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, or the CZMA, the "higher" level of government tends to restrict
its role primarily to regulating those significant activities or sensitive natural resources or areas
having substantial effects upon citizens residing beyond the boundaries of the "lower" level of
government.
8. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982). See generally Federal CLM, supra note 1, at 154-59.
9. See infra notes 11-20 and accompanying text. For an analysis of case law supporting this
proposition, see Federal CLM, supra note 1, at 229-39.
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such as the CZMA. l" Congress is not well-equipped to carry the full
burden of experimentation, amendment, and interstitial development of
coastal land management programs; other federalist values are also at
stake which make a strong, concurrent state role desirable. Preemptive
federal programs should be exceptional, and cooperative and concurrent
regulatory programs should be encouraged.
The Commerce Clause
The commerce clause provides ample authority for Congress to regulate
critical coastal resources. The Supreme Court has shown great willingness
to uphold wide-ranging economic, environmental, and social regulatory
programs under the clause.1' The result for coastal land management
purposes is a "federal police power" under the commerce clause,' 2 closely
analogous to the states' police power reserved under the Tenth Amend-
ment. Clearly "[i]t is no objection [that the exercise of this federal police
power] is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the
police power of the states." 3 Under the supremacy clause, irreconcilable
conflicts between national and state regulation are resolved in favor of
the national government.
In 1981, the Supreme Court outlined the "relatively narrow" scope of
judicial review to be applied when courts decide whether a particular
exercise of congressional power is valid under the commerce clause. In
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,'4 the
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982).
11. As the author of a comprehensive study of United States Supreme Court cases from 1937 to
1970 concludes:
Congress, under the authority of the Commerce Clause, is able to reach into every
nook and cranny of the highly interdependent American economic system. It has
unquestioned control over any business activity which in any way "effects" commerce,
regardless of how "local" that activity may be, how remote or "indirect" its effect
may be, and how small or insignificant the contribution of a single instance may be
if it is representative of "many others similarly situated." Nor is Congress limited to
the regulation of subjects which are wholly economic in nature; by virtue of its
commerce power it can strike at the primarily moral evils of gambling (Champion v.
Ames), prostitution (Hoke v. United States), and racial discrimination in public ac-
commodations (Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States and Katzenbach v. McClung),
the only constitutional requirement being the showing of a connection between the
prohibited activity and that commerce or intercourse which "concerns more states than
one."
R. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970, 345 (1970). See generally
Rosenthal, The Federal Power to Protect The Environment: Available Devices to Compel or Induce
Desired Conduct, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 397, 398-402 (1972).
12. For discussions of federal "police power" under the commerce clause, see, e.g., United
States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) (misbranded drugs); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124
(1936) (kidnapping); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (prostitution); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903) (lottery tickets).
13. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
14. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977's
against several constitutional challenges. The following commerce clause
test was enunciated:
The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated
activity affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for
such a finding .... This established, the only remaining question
for judicial inquiry is whether the "means chosen by [Congress] is
reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution."...
The judicial task is at an end once the court determines that Congress
acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme. 6
Coastal regulation often addresses major conflicts among economic,
social, and environmental values. Because of the character of most critical
coastal resources, any significant development of these resources affects
citizens beyond the boundaries of individual states. The expansive sweep
of the commerce power allows the national government to regulate these
external effects in major watersheds, wetlands, and beaches if Congress
so desires.
The commerce clause cases suggest that Congress is restrained almost
exclusively by political considerations in exercising federal regulatory
power in the coastal zone. The courts are likely to defer to congressional
judgment. 17 For example, in Perez v. United States, 18 the Supreme Court
did not even seek to determine whether the cumulative effect of the
prohibited activities had an actual relationship in interstate commerce.
Instead, the Court seemed to say that a particular activity could be reg-
ulated as long as it was part of a class of activities, most of which relate
to interstate commerce. "Where the class of activities is regulated and
that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power
'to exercise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." 9
The Spending Power
The national spending power is arguably the most important power in
its actual impact on federal and state relationships.2' Congress, by offering
15. 30 U. S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
16. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (citing
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964)).
17. Cf. "[O]ne could easily get the sense from this Court's opinions that the federal system exists
only at the sufferance of Congress." Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 308 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). For recent cases indicating that the principle of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), is not likely to limit significantly judicial
deference to congressional judgment, see generally Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Wyoming, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982); and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
18. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
19. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
20. G. GuNTHER, CASES AN MATEIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 224 (10th ed. 1980).
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the inducement of federal funds, has been able to implement many na-
tional policies having significant regulatory consequences. Conditional
grants-in-aid can be traced at least as far back as the 19th century, and
they have become increasingly popular in recent years.2 '
United States v. Butler illustrates that exercises of the spending power
are tested by a "general welfare" standard. The 1936 case adopts the
Hamiltonian view that
[t]he clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later
enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them, and
Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to appro-
priate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to
provide for the general welfare of the United States.'
Justice Cardozo, in 1937, endorsed Butler's adoption of the Hamiltonian
position.'s A 1950 case noted that "Congress has a substantive power to
tax and appropriate for the general welfare, limited only by the require-
ment that it shall be exercised for the common benefit as distinguished
from some mere local purpose."24
The purposes enunciated by the CZMA are clearly legitimate purposes
of national spending. Since Congress can, if it chooses, preempt the
entire field of coastal land management,'s totally displacing state and
local governments, it can then, with even greater reason, enact a federal
grant-in-aid program to encourage state and local governments to plan
and regulate the uses of coastal lands.
Still, to say that Congress has the power totally to displace state and
local governments is not to say that Congress can enact programs without
any regard for the effects on state sovereignty. The 1976 National League
of Cities v. Usery decision,26 although enunciating a limitation on the
commerce power, underscored the importance of this distinction. In a
footnote to the majority opinion, the Court noted:
"[We express no view as to whether different results might obtain
if Congress seeks to effect integral operations of state governments
by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Con-
stitution such as the spending power, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1, or Sec.
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
21. Id. at 236.
22. 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
23. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). See generally GUNTHER, supra note 20, at 235.
24. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950).
25. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. For an analysis of case law supporting this
proposition, see Federal CLM, supra note 1, at 229-39.
26. 426 U.S. 383 (1976).
27. \Id. at 852 n. 17. But see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v Wyoming, - U.S.
-, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982); and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981), which
indicate that National League will be tightly constrained where the commerce clause is the source
of federal law.
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The Supreme Court has long recognized the possibility that conditional
grants-in-aid might intrude unduly on state autonomy. Justice Cardozo
questioned in 1937 whether the Social Security Act, although held con-
stitutional, nevertheless involved "the coercion of the States in contrav-
ention of the Tenth Amendment or of restrictions implicit in our federal
form of government." 28 Although the Supreme Court has hinted at this
reserved judicial check on the spending power, actual challenges to federal
spending conditions on state autonomy grounds have not succeeded. For
example, in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission, 9 the
Court refused to invalidate the conditioning of federal highway funds on
the state's compliance with provisions of the Hatch Act."
Concerns about the effects of undue federal intrusion should be heeded
in evaluating the effectiveness of the CZMA and other federal regulatory
programs in the coastal zone. Decisions concerning how coastal resources
are allocated and used should reflect the varied needs of a diverse pop-
ulation. They should be made within an institutional setting that leaves
maximum latitude for private initiative and experimentation. The imple-
28. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937). See also GUNTHER, supra note 20
at 232-37.
29. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See also Bell v. New Jersey, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2187 (1983)
(upholding federal right to demand return of misapplied funds). "Requiring States to honor the
obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding before recognizing their ownership
of funds simply does not intrude on their sovereignty." Id. at 2197.
30. 330 U.S. at 129 (citing the Hatch Activity Act, 53 Stat. 1147 amended by 54 Stat. 767
(1940)). Conditional grants have become increasingly popular in recent years, and the number and
types of criticisms have increased accordingly.
In 1975, the presidents of Harvard and Yale deplored, in the Yale president's words, the "dan-
gerously fashionable" trend of using "the leverage of the government dollar to accomplish objectives
which have nothing to do with the purposes for which the dollar is given." Address by Kingman
Brewster, Jr., President, Yale University, Annual Dinner of the Fellows of the American Bar Foun-
dation, Chicago, Ill. (Feb. 22, 1975). Both administrators noted how government regulation of
postsecondary education had grown, particularly, Harvard's president noted, in such areas as "em-
ployment practices, admissions procedures, student records, safety requirements, and even the
conduct of research." Introduction to President Derek C. Bok's 1974-75 Annual Report to the Harvard
University Board of Overseers, 19 Harv. Today 1 (1976). Each had admonitions worth considering,
because many of the values of localism, voluntarism, and diversity that are threatened by unnecessary
restrictions of university autonomy are similarly threatened by unnecessary restriction of state and
local governmental autonomy. President Bok reported to the members of the Harvard Board of
Overseers:
Because of the value of autonomy and diversity, there are obvious costs in attempting
to influence universities through government rules. By limiting the discretion of uni-
versity personnel, rules diminish initiative and experimentation .... Because regu-
lations must be reasonably uniform in nature, they also threaten to impinge upon the
diversity of the system .... [F]ederal intervention can have a levelling effect which
fails to take due account of the special contribution that particular institutions should
make in a diversified system .... For these reasons, the government would be wise
not to impose rules unless it is clear that significant problems exist which cannot be
rectified by universities themselves or resolved by subsidies, incentives or other less
drastic methods of intervention.
Id. at 10.
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mentation of the CZMA has thus far been reasonable: the conditions have
been reasonably related to the purposes of the act, and there has been no
serious indication that the CZMA has been administered in a manner that
intrudes unduly on state autonomy.3"
Balancing and Preemption
The states and their delegates may continue to regulate coastal land
use even if the regulation incidentally affects interstate commerce; courts,
however, will have to decide at what point the state's regulation of its
local affairs unreasonably burdens interstate commerce. The basic test,
originally formulated in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,2 is whether the
subject matter of the state legislation is "in [its] nature national, or
admit[s] only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation."33 Of course
most federal-state land use conflicts are not likely to pose such a clear
case for "one uniform system, or plan of regulation."
A common Supreme Court approach for reconciling local and extra-
territorial interests is the "balancing" test enunciated in 1942 in Parker
v. Brown34 and summarized in the 1970 case, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
as follows:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.35
To determine whether local regulation interferes with commerce, courts
31. This was the author's conclusion when Federal CLM, supra note 1, was published, and the
author has found no condition or administrative practice that refutes this position.
32. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
33. Id. at 319.
34. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See generally Note, Parker v. Brown:A Preemption Analysis, 84 YALE
L.J. 1164 (1975).
35. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). A classic example of the Court's application of the balancing test
was Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), which involved an Arizona
statute regulating the length of interstate trains. The Court weighed the local benefit of the law as
a safety measure and the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from serious interference
and concluded that the "slight and dubious" local advantage was "outweighed by the interest of the
nation in an adequate, economical, and efficient railway transportation service." Id. at 783-84. See
also Arkansas Electric Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Comm'n., - U.S. -. , 103 S. Ct. 1905
(1983) (discusses the "general trend in our modem commerce clause jurisprudence to look in every
case to the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective of the state, and the effect of the
regulation upon the national interest in commerce)." Id. at 1915. Held: burden on commerce, although
having incidental effect, not clearly excessive. Id. at 1918.
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must consider the questions: (1) What, if any, burden is imposed on
interstate commerce by the questioned legislation? (2) How substantial
is this burden? (3) Is the interest sought to be served by the legislation
a legitimate local concern? (4) Is the legislation a reasonable means of
reaching the end desired? (5) Are there reasonable and adequate alter-
natives available? 6 The balancing test has recently been undergoing con-
siderable refinement.37 One can only conjecture whether the courts will
apply a consistent theory. Some recent lower federal court cases suggest
that in coastal land management conflicts, the balancing approach may
virtually be ignored because of the tendency to presume the validity of
state and local legislative judgments in matters having complex environ-
mental, social, and economic implications. 8 The cases reflect the courts'
36. For an application of the first four questions, see, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of
Chicago, 509 E2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). For an application of the
fifth question, see Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). The Court has summarized
the analytic approach of Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, as follows:
Under that general rule, we must inquire (1) whether the challenged statute regulates
evenhandedly with only "incidental" effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates
against interstate commerce either on its face or in practical effect; (2) whether the
statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3) whether alternative means
could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating against interstate
commerce.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (an Oklahoma statute facially discriminated against
interstate commerce, thereby invoking the "strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose
and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.") Id. at 337. Held: repugnant to the commerce
clause. Although recognizing that Oklahoma could still protect and conserve wild animal life within
its borders, "States may promote this legitimate purpose only in ways consistent with the basic
principle that 'our economic unit is the nation."' Id. at 339 (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons Inc. v.
Dumond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
37. See notes 38-39 infra.
38. In Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975), the court upheld the constitutionality of Chicago's phosphate ban ordinance,
concluding:
We hold that the burden is so slight compared to the important and properly local
objective that the presumption we discussed earlier should apply. We will accept the
City Council's determination that this phosphate ban is a reasonable means of achieving
the elimination and prevention of nuisance algae unless we find that the plaintiffs have
presented clear and convincing proof to the contrary.
509 F.2d at 80. See also Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) (where the Ninth Circuit court refused to consider the
federal right-to-travel issue upon which the district court had rested its decision in finding uncon-
stitutional the "Petaluma Plan" for controlling the influx of new residents). (The plaintiffs had not
met the "zone of interest" requirement of Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)). The court also
considered due process and commerce clause issues, on which the appellees had standing.
On the latter, the court concluded that its ruling that "the Petaluma Plan represents a reasonable
and legitimate exercise of the police power obviates the necessity of remanding the case for con-
sideration of appellees' claim that the Plan unreasonably burdens interstate commerce." 522 F2d at
909. The court applied the Huron Cement test, see Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
448 (1960), that "a state regulation validly based on the police power does not impermissibly burden
interstate commerce where the regulation neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor
operates to disrupt its required uniformity." 522 F.2d at 909. Thus the court followed a line of
authorities that arguably make it improper for a court "to review state legislation by balancing
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unwillingness to attempt to balance factors that are not commensurable.
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey39
indicates, however, that the Court will be quick to strike down state
legislation that implements parochial economic protectionist goals by
means that ostensibly further environmental protection.
The increase in legislative activity in the coastal zone portends addi-
tional conflicts between state and federal legislation on the same subject
matter, thereby implicating the doctrine of federal preemption. Preemp-
tion, functionally related to the burdening of commerce, is conceptually
separate." The doctrine allows courts to determine (1) that Congress has
occupied a field, thereby foreclosing the operation of state legislation in
the same field even if there are gaps in the federal legislation, and even
if the state legislation is not in conflict with the federal scheme; or (2)
that state legislation cannot stand because it is in conflict with federal
reasonable social welfare legislation against its incidental burden on commerce." Id. See, e.g.,
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968); Breard
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. Clark, 330 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D.
Fla. 1971); American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691
(Ore. Ct. App. 1973). The latter cases also spoke to the value of local regulation. In Soap &
Detergent, the court observed: "the problem of water pollution is not subject to uniform national
regulation, but rather by its very nature lies within the domain of the local units of government.
The qualities and characteristics of bodies of water differ from region to region." 330 F. Supp. at
1222. The American Can court also referred to the importance of local legislative judgments stating
that "Changing living conditions or variations in the experience or habits of different communities
may well call for different legislative regulations as to methods and manners of doing business."
15 Or. App. at -, 517 P.2d at 698. The court further noted that "Each state is a laboratory for
innovation and experimentation in a healthy federal system. What fails may be abandoned and what
succeeds may be emulated by other states. The bottle bill is now unique; it may later be regarded
as seminal." Id. at-.., 517 P.2d at 700.
But cf. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). Although not contrary to the
authorities cited supra, Sporhase demonstrates that facially discriminatory legislation (in Sporhase
a groundwater reciprocity provision that "operates as an explicit barrier to commerce between the
States," id. at 957) is subject to "strictest scrutiny" with the state having the burden of demonstrating
a "close fit between [the facially discriminatory] ... provision and its asserted local purpose." Id.
at 958. Nebraska's law failed to clear this hurdle. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized several factors
relevant to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test, including the following one relevant to the text
to which this note is appended:
First, a State's power to regulate the use of water in times and places of shortage for
the purpose of protecting the health of its citizens-and not simply the health of its
economy-is at the core of its police power. For Commerce Clause purposes, we have
long recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and
health and safety regulation, on the other.
Id. at 956.
39. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). See also South Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, - U.S. -
104 S. Ct. 2237 at 2247 (1984); Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 956.
40. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
- U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de Ia Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 152 (1982). See generally, Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U.
COLO. L. REv. 51 (1973); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 CoLuM. L. REV. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Preemption Doctrine].
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legislation. 4' The doctrine is based on the supremacy clause and is relevant
in resolving the difficult problem that arises when the state seeks to forbid
an activity even though it would be allowed by the federal government.
Scholarly efforts to find consistent doctrinal bases for preemption de-
cisions usually conclude that these decisions simply reflect the prevailing
attitudes of a majority of the Court toward federalist values and the nature
of the subject matter regulated.4" Nevertheless, preemption cases are of
value for understanding the federal courts' potential role in shaping coastal
land management programs. The cases also aid in gleaning, as in the
interference-with-commerce cases, some notion of the judicial policies
favoring either exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction where congres-
sional intent is unclear.
The 1963 Supreme Court case of Florida Lime andAvocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul4 3 suggests an important principle for resolving most coastal
land management preemption questions: federal legislation affecting land
use, because it occurs in a field traditionally subject mainly to state and
local control, should be subjected to a presumption against federal
preemption. This presumption may gain particular strength before the
current Court. A recent study of the preemption doctrine concludes that
a trend toward a solicitous spirit with respect to federal interests during
the Warren Court era has shifted back to a sympathy with state interests
under the Burger Court.'
41. See Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, - U.S. - , 103 S. Ct. 2246, 2301 (1983); Pacific Gas &
Elec., 103 S. Ct. at 1722; Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan 458 U.S. at 153 (summarizing the principles
of preemption).
42. Cf., e.g., Note, Preemption Doctrine, supra note 40, at 651-54.
43. 373 U.S. 132 (1963). The three-step approach is to determine whether (1) there is a federal
law in effect in the same field as the challenged state law; (2) the federal law was either expressly
or by necessary implication intended to be exclusive; (3) the state law nevertheless "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). In Florida Lime, the challenged California statute
had the effect of excluding as immature six out of every 100 Florida-grown avocados shipped to
California. The Florida avocados satisfied a federal regulation designed to ensure the maturity of
avocados. This was the first step. In the second step, finding no inevitable collision between the
two schemes of regulation, id at 143, the Court asked "Does either the nature of the subject matter,
namely the maturity of avocados, or any explicit declaration of congressional design to displace
state regulation, require [the California statute] to yield to the federal marketing orders?" Id. Finding
that "the maturity of avocados is a subject matter of the kind this court has traditionally regarded
as properly within the scope of state superintendence," id. at 144, the Court applied the "settled
mandate ... not to decree such a federal displacement 'unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."' Id. at 146 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)). Then the third test, whether the state regulation stands as an obstacle, was applied, and the
majority opinion answered in the negative. Id. at 141. Four justices dissented, concluding that the
federal legislation and regulations "leave no room for this inconsistent and conflicting state legis-
lation." Id. at 160. The dissenting opinion emphasized that in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341
(1943), the federal regulatory scheme was partial and incomplete. Also, the dissent was concerned
that "there is no indication that the state regulatory scheme has any purpose other than protecting
the good will of the avocado industry." Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 169.
44. Note, Preemption Doctrine, supra note 40 at 623. The principal cases relied on for this
conclusion were: Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (denying the constitutional exclusivity
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Land use decisions are unique; they have multiple and often hidden
effects. Special attitudes about land may consciously or unconsciously
affect preemption decisions. Because of the wide geographic and far-
reaching substantive effects of land use decisions, there is often a need
for multiple decision points.4' Thus, for reasons of administrative fea-
sibility and political theory, good coastal land management is not likely
to be provided by exclusive federal regulatory programs.
In 1954, Professor Henry Hart drew attention to the result of uniformity,
"to thrust upon Congress a burden of exclusive responsibility for the
interstitial development of legal doctrine-a burden which it is wholly
unequipped to bear."46 He correctly predicted that the trend would pass,
pointing out two reasons why a procrustean solution of perfect national
uniformity would not find wide favor:
The first is the workaday reason of administrative feasibility .
of the federal copyright power); New York State Dep't of Social Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405
(1973) (upholding New York's Work Rules); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)
(holding that federal patent law did not preempt state trade secret law); and Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (upholding a California statute voiding forfeitures
under a profit-sharing plan). The author of the Preemption Doctrine note concluded that only one
case, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973), which found Burbank's
curfew on late-night flights preempted by federal aviation regulations, suggested that "the return to
a state-directed presumption may not be a complete reversal of prior decisions." Note, Preemption
Doctrine, supra note 40 at 651.
Recent preemption cases can be reconciled with the author's conclusion in Note, Preemption
Doctrine, supra note 40. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan, 458 U.S. 141 (1981), held that federal law
and regulations preempt conflicting California limitations on the due-on-sale practices of federal
savings and loan associations; however, the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loans were
expressly intended to be governed "exclusively by federal law." Id. at 671. The Court noted that
the otherwise relevant importance that real property was the subject regulated is not relevant when
federal law is expressly intended to prevail. Id. at 152-53. Similarly, although the Court concluded,
in Exxon Corp., - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983) that a particular "pass-through" provision
was preempted insofar as it applied to sales of gas in interstate commerce, the Court reached this
conclusion because "the pass-through prohibition represented an attempt to legislate in a field that
Congress has chosen to occupy." Id. at 2302. The Court, in Pacific Gas, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct.
1713 (1983), noted that "[n]eed for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and
services, are areas that have been characteristically governed by the States." Id. at 1723. The Court
concluded that the challenged California statute had an economic purpose and, accordingly, lay
"outside the occupied field of nuclear safety regulation." Id. at 1728. Other provisions also withstood
a preemption challenge, the Court concluding that:
the legal reality remains that Congress has left sufficient authority in the states to allow
the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons.
Given this statutory scheme, it is for Congress to rethink the division of regulatory
authority in light of its possible exercise by the states to undercut a federal objective.
The courts should not assume the role which our system assigns to Congress.
Id. at 1732.
45. For a discussion of California's and Florida's legislation that, through multiple decision points,
promotes the goal of assuring that all affected citizens be represented in the decisionmaking process,
see infra notes 57-73 and accompanying text. In Florida's Development of Regional Impact review
process, FLA. STATS. § 380.06, for example, a local government's development order must be
based upon a consideration of regional and state-wide policies and is subject to being appealed to
the state Adjudicatory Commission.
46. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
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The second reason is more basic. Common sense and the instinct
for freedom alike can be counted upon to tell the American people
never to put all their eggs of hope from governmental problem-
solving in one government basket. 4
The trend toward an increased federal voice in land use decisionmaking
calls for reconsideration of the values of a federal system that have been
eloquently described by Professor Herbert Wechsler as follows:
In a far flung, free society, the federalist values are enduring. They
call upon a people to achieve a unity sufficient to resist their common
perils and advance their common welfare, without undue sacrifice
of their diversities and the creative energies to which diversity gives
rise. They call for government responsive to the will of the full
national constituency, without loss of responsiveness to lesser voices,
reflecting smaller bodies of opinion, in areas that constitute their
own legitimate concern."
Wechsler's essay emphasized James Madison's belief that the composition
of Congress and the political processes are better adapted to containing
authority than are the courts.4 9 Federal intervention as against the states,
Wechsler argued, is primarily a matter for congressional, not judicial,
determination."
This federalist philosophy, particularly relevant in a field as diverse as
planning and regulation of land use, suggests that the courts should be
generally reluctant to find congressional preemption. Rather, the judiciary
should leave it to Congress expressly to shift the historically decentralized
land management process to a higher level, if such exclusive federal
jurisdiction is needed, or to enact uniform policies, if uniformity among
the states is needed. The commerce clause and preemption cases indicate
that such a philosophy of decentralization and experimentation is being
encouraged by various judicial techniques for deferring to state and local
legislative judgments.
THE STATE APPROACH
California51
California's coastal program embodies a philosophy of intergovern-
mental relationships strikingly similar to the philosophy of the American
47. Id. at 540.
48. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
49. Id. at 558-59.
50. Id.
51. For a second, more comprehensive view, see Hildreth & Johnson, CZM in California, Oregon,
and Washington, 25 NAT. RES. J. 103 (1985).
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Law Institute's (ALI) Model Land Development Code;52 that is, that land
development regulation should occur, to the extent feasible, at the local
government level. The California, Florida, and ALI Code approaches,
however, all recognize that land use regulation in sensitive coastal areas
cannot be left entirely to the unfettered choices of local government
officials .
Several features of California's Coastal Act of 197654 promote the goal
of achieving maximum local involvement within a framework that assures
that state and regional interests will not be ignored. Once a local coastal
program receives state certification, many local decisions become final
(except for judicial review). Significant development activities and par-
ticular projects in sensitive resource areas, however, remain subject to
appeal to the state commission.5 Similarly, the state continues to perform
a monitoring function through the commission's power to review amend-
ments of certified local programs. 6
California's coastal regulatory experiences show the advantages of a
reasonable compromise between localism and centralism. State legisla-
tures should take the leadership role in designing coastal land management
mechanisms, but the resulting design should not necessarily establish a
strong, direct state regulatory role. The diversities of a large state, such
as California, make it easier to advocate a major role for local govern-
ments. The same arguments can be made in most states that have heavily
urbanized coastal areas. A strong local role encourages innovation and
experimentation and is likely to promote more citizen participation. The
"creative spark" will more likely come from encouraging experimentation
by individuals and small units of government. Central authority, although
often suitable for monitoring compliance with broad policies, is not likely
to promote grass roots enthusiasm and experimentation.
California's 1972-75 coastal regulatory experiences57 revealed that the
state's 1,000 yard-wide land regulatory zone needed substantial adjust-
ments. Many observers agreed that 1,000 yards was unnecessarily large
for well-developed urban areas. The 1976 California Coastal Act, ac-
cordingly, allows reduction of the zone in urban areas. 8 The experience
in rural areas having sensitive natural features convinced the legislature
52. MODEL LAND DEa. CODE (1976).
53. See id., art. 7, Areas of Critical State Concern, §§ 7-201 to 208. For a discussion of California's
and Florida's balances, see also infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
54. CAL. Pua. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977 & Cumm. Supp. 1984).
55. Id. § 30603.
56. Id. § 30514.
57. See, e.g., Finnell, Coastal Land Management in California, 1978 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 647 [hereinafter cited as Calif. CLMJ.
58. Id. at 727-29.
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that 1,000 yards was far too small. 9 Accordingly, the Act now provides
for a zone of up to five miles inland for certain sensitive resource areas."
One possible deficiency of the zone relates to the ability of the California
Coastal Commission to prevent unnecessary conversion of prime agri-
cultural lands to nonagricultural uses. More must be understood, however,
about how other regulatory reforms, such as the coastal conservancy
provisions,6" will function before reaching that conclusion.
The geographic and substantive jurisdiction of coastal decisionmakers
should not be divorced from related housing, transportation, energy, and
other matters of statewide concern. The 1976 California Coastal Act made
commendable efforts to coordinate the coastal function with other state
programs.62 Still, there is room for improvement. 63 "Affordable housing"
is a prime example of the problem. By 1980, the California Coastal
Commission was aggressively implementing the coastal act's requirement
that "housing opportunities for persons ... of low or moderate income
... shall be protected, encouraged, and, where feasible, provided. "'
The program became so controversial, however, that the California leg-
islature repealed the Coastal Commission's authority over "affordable
housing" and transferred the function to local government.65 Particularly
in California, the low-and moderate-income housing problem should be
addressed as a statewide problem.
The California legislature should provide a better statutory base for
statewide comprehensive planning. Although the Office of Planning and
Research made commendable efforts in the late 1970s, 6 California needs
a better process for preparing and adopting statewide policies. Politically,
comprehensive coastal planning probably had to precede statewide com-
prehensive planning, and, undoubtedly, enactment of additional planning
programs is unlikely in the current political climate.67 In practice, how-
59. Id.
60. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30103(a) (West 1977 & Cum. Supp 1984).
61. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§31000-31406 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1984). The California
Coastal Act of 1976 covers prime and other agricultural lands. Id. §§ 30241 & 30242. A coastal
commission staff member believes that the commission and staff have "been fairly stringent in our
protection of agricultural land." Interview with Jack Liebster, in San Francisco (Sept. 19, 1983).
He cites the County of Santa Cruz as an example of the commission's efforts. In Santa Cruz and
San Mateo Counties, the landward coastal zone boundaries are among the widest in the state, id.,
so the coastal commission has been actively promoting the act's policy of maintaining the "maximum
amount of prime agricultural land .. . in agricultural production. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE
§ 30241(a) (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
62. CAL. PuB. Rzs. CODE § 30400-30419 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
63. See generally Calif. CLM, supra note 57, at 705-09.
64. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch 1330, repealed by 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 1007.
65. Id.
66. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65307-65040.7 (West 1983). See generally Calif. CLM, supra note 57,
at 702-09.
67. See Weber, Evolution of an Agency, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1984, at 25 (tracing the ebbs and flows
of the California Coastal Commission's political acceptance, with particular emphasis on Governor
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ever, it is artificial, and often counterproductive, to divorce coastal plan-
ning from statewide planning for other purposes.
Florida6
8
Florida has some of the nation's more innovative and effective land
and water use management systems, yet its coastal land management sys-
tem has been less effective than California's. Florida's coastal program
has not been well-coordinated and integrated.69 Extensive 1984 legisla-
tion, however, promises substantial improvement.7"
An analyst of state land use planning and regulation concluded in 1979
that "Florida is truly the nation's chief land use laboratory."'" Florida
has experimented with all the federally-recommended models for allo-
cating land and water regulatory power between state and local govern-
ments.7' Florida's landmark 1972 legislative package73 and 1975 local
planning act74 will probably have as much influence on the evolution of
American land planning law as California's Proposition 20 of 1972 and
its Coastal Act of 1976."5 Indeed, Florida's 1984 political climate appears
George Deukmejian's "unwavering opposition to the Coastal Commission"). Id. "When the Leg-
islature appropriated $7.2 million for the commission in the 1983-84 budget, Deukmejian pared the
figure to $5.8 million ... and when Senator Robert Presley (D.-Riverside) sponsored a bill that
reinstated some $1 million in federal funds that had been destined for the commission, the governor
resolutely slashed the appropriation in half." Id. at 26. See generally Calif. CLM, supra note 57,
at 707 n.211 (noting that, by 1978, statewide comprehensive planning was not a popular idea in
California).
68. See also O'Connell, Florida's Struggle for Approval Under the Coastal Zone Management
Act, 25 NAT. REs. J. 61 (1985).
69. See generally Resource Management Task Force, Final Report to Governor Bob Graham 11-
15 (Tallahassee: Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Graham Task Force Report] (an "integrated policy
framework" is first among the task force's recommendations); and Finnell, Coastal Land Management
in Florida, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 303, 394-95 [hereinafter cited as Florida CLM].
70. See, e.g., the Florida State and Regional Planning Act of 1984, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 84-257, amending FLA. STAT. ANN. §§23.011-.019 & 160.01-09 (West 1978 & Cum. Supp.
1984) (providing, inter alia, for preparation and adoption of state and regional plans and for better
coordination among state and regional agencies).
71. T. PELHAM, STATE LAND-USE PLANNING AND REGULATION (1979).
72. (A) State establishment of criteria and standards for local implementation, subject to
administrative review and enforcement for compliance;
(B) Direct state land and water use planning and regulation; or State administrative
review for consistency with the management program of all development plans,
projects, or land and water use regulations, including exceptions and variances
thereto, proposed by any state or local authority or private developer, with power
to approve or disapprove after public notice and an opportunity for hearings.
16 U.S.C. § 1455(e)(1)(A)-(C) (1982).
73. Florida Environmental Land and Water Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.01-.25 (West
1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984); Land Conservation Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§259.01-.07 (West
1975 & Cum. supp. 1984); Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 373.011-
.617 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
74. Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-
.3211 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
75. California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, 1972 Cal. Stat. A-181 (repealed on Jan.
1, 1977); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§30000-30900 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
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much more conducive to land and water regulatory reform than Califor-
nia's.76
Florida's planning framework can be visualized as a pyramid. Planning
at the base is done by local governments pursuant to the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975;77 at the mid-level by regional
agencies, such as regional councils of government;78 and at the vortex
by state agencies, such as the Executive Office of the Governor and the
state land planning agency.7 9
All local governments in Florida are now required to adopt local com-
prehensive plans which become the standards by which subsequent de-
velopment orders and development regulations are measured for
consistency.8" These local plans must include several elements relevant
to coastal land management.8 ' The plans have the potential of becoming
the most important part of Florida's coastal land management process.
Even considering the 1984 reforms, Florida's legislature, however, still
must require that the local plans be better coordinated and integrated with
regional and statewide plans.82
Coastal planning at the state and regional level must result in adoption
of broad principles, policies, and standards similar to the coastal resources
planning and management policies enacted by the legislature as part of
the California Coastal Act of 1976.83 Florida's legislature should either
directly enact similar policies as law or the governor and cabinet should
achieve this comprehensive coastal planning goal by vigorous imple-
mentation of the Florida State and Regional Planning Act of 1984.84 The
latter alternative seems preferable because comprehensive coastal plan-
76. Governor Graham and both houses of the Florida Legislature appear committed to improving
Florida's land use and environmental regulatory programs. In addition to the 1984 State and Regional
Planning Act, the 1984 session enacted amendments to the Development of Regional Impact (DRI)
process, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 84-331 (authorizing developers to submit an areawide
development plan for review); amendments to FLA. STAT. ANN. 367.051 (West 1984), 1984 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. ch 84-133 (granting county and municipal governments standing to object to water
and sewer system certificates on grounds that issuance of the certificate will violate local compre-
hensive plans); and the Wetlands Protection Act of 1984, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch-., amending
FLA. STAT. ANN. chs 253 & 403, (which, inter alia, streamlines the dredge and fill permitting by
the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) and allows DER to consider wildlife and habitat
when deciding whether to issue a permit).
77. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (West Cum. Supp. 1984).
78. See Florida Regional Planning Council Act of 1980, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.011-.0193 (West
Cum. Supp. 1981), amended by the 1984 State and Regional Planning Act, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. ch. 84257.
79. 1984 State and Regional Planning Act, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 84-257.
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 163.3184, 163.3144 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
81. Id., e.g., § 163.3177(6)(a) (futurelanduseplan); § 163.3177(6)(d) (conservation); § 163.3177(6)(e)
(recreation and open space); § 163.3177(6)(g) (coastal zone protection).
82. For the author's detailed discussion, see Florida CLM, supra note 69, at 395-98.
83. CAL. PuB. RFs. CODE §§30200-30264 (West 1983).
84. 1984 State and Regional Planning Act, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 84-257.
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ning should be a central part of Florida's statewide comprehensive plan-
ning for other purposes; Florida's legislature also appears to prefer this
approach.85 Whichever alternative is adopted, the legislature should con-
tinue its regulatory reform by requiring that all local comprehensive plans
be reviewed and certified for consistency with regional and state plans.
The Florida State and Regional Planning Act of 1984 underscores the
important role of regional planning councils in state policy development.86
The Act provides that the regional planning councils are "the primary
organization to address problems and plan solutions that are of greater
than local concern or scope, and ... shall be recognized by local gov-
ernments as one of the means to provide input into state policy devel-
opment."'87 The Act defines "comprehensive regional policy plan" 8 and
requires that the plan "shall be consistent with and shall further the state
comprehensive plan and implement and accurately reflect the goals and
policies of the state comprehensive plan. 89
Although Florida has several coastal regulatory programs,"' the Florida
Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972 (FLWMA) has
gained the most national attention. 9' The FLWMA utilizes two techniques
for increased state participation in land regulation: (1) "Areas of Critical
State Concern" (critical areas) and (2) "Development of Regional Impact"
(DRI). The fact that some geographic areas are so sensitive, by their
nature and characteristics, that such development in the area is likely to
have substantial extraterritorial effects wherever they are undertaken,
forms the premise of the critical areas process.
The critical areas process works as follows: the Administration Com-
mission (governor and cabinet)9" designates a discrete geographical area;
specifies standards with which each affected local government's land
development regulations must comply; and adopts, if local government
fails to submit adequate regulations, suitable land development regula-
tions to be administered by local authorities. The 1979 amendments,"' in
85. For a brief history of the state comprehensive planning process, see Florida CLM, supra note
69, at 314-19. See also 1984 State and Regional Planning Act, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 84-
257.
86. 1984 State and Regional Planning Act, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 84-257.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., THE USE OF LAD: A CrrIZEN's POLICY GUIn TO URBAN GROWVM (W. Reilly ed.
1973) (the report of the Rockefeller sponsored Task Force on Land Use and Urban Growth, which
concluded that the 1972 legislative package is "one of the strongest sets of land and water management
laws yet to clear a state legislature." Id. at 39); T. PELHAM, supra note 71; J. DEGROVE, LAND,
GRowTH & POLMCS 106-76 (1984).
92. For the critical areas process, see FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.05-380.0552 (West. 1974 & Cum.
Supp. 1981). For a recent evaluation of the critical areas process, see DEGROVE, supra note 91, at
130-53.
93. 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-73.
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response to Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,94 also ensure strong legislative
supervision: the administrative commissions rule designating the area
must be submitted to the legislature for "review." Land development
regulations adopted within the critical area become effective only upon
such review. Even then, the area's designation faces a three-year "sunset"
provision, further ensuring continued, close legislative scrutiny.
A developer proposing development within the critical area applies for
a permit to the relevant local government, which conducts an initial
hearing on the application and issues its development order, granting or
denying the permit. The order is final unless appealed to the Florida Land
and Water Adjudicatory Commission (also the governor and cabinet).
The 1979 amendments gave institutional status to an informal, coop-
erative process which the state land planning agency had utilized suc-
cessfully during the previous five years. 9 A Resource Planning and
Management Committee (resource committee)96 must be appointed by
the governor prior to recommending the designation of a critical area.
The objective of the resource committee is to seek resolution, through
voluntary and cooperative means, of the problems that may endanger the
resources, facilities, and areas potentially subject to critical area desig-
nation. The 1984 legislation provides for better coordination between the
resource committee and other state, regional, and local programs. 97
If the state subsequently undertakes formal designation of a critical
area, the state land planning agency's recommendations to the governor
and cabinet (administration commission) must include any report or rec-
ommendation of the resource committee. Later, when the legislature re-
views the designation of a critical area, "the Legislature may consider,
among other factors, whether a resource planning and management com-
mittee established a program."
98
Florida's Development of Regional Impact (DRI) process resembles
the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) process under the California
Environmental Quality Act.99 The DRI process has a stronger nexus,
however, between its regional impact report and the ultimate regulatory
94. 372 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
95. See The Apalachicola River and Bay System: A Florida Resource (1977); Charlotte Harbor:
A Florida Resource (1978).
96. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.045 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
97. Act of June 19, 1984, 1984 Fla. Laws ch. 84-281. For a recent assessment, see generally
DEGROVE, supra note 91, at 151-53.
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. §380.05(l)(c) (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
99. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§2100-21176 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979). For Florida's DRI
process, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984). For a recent evaluation
of the DRI process, see generally DEGROVE, supra note 91, at 153-66.
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decision to grant or deny a development application."° Developers who
undertake "any development which, because of its character, magnitude,
or location, would have a substantial effect upon the health, safety, or
welfare of citizens of more than one county"'' must apply to the relevant
local government for a development permit. When the local government
hears the application, it must consider the regional impact as reported by
the regional planning agency and the consistency of the proposed devel-
opment with any applicable state land development plan. The local gov-
ernment's development order is final, unless the order is appealed to the
state land and water adjudicatory commission.
The legislature has provided two principal means for determining whether
a proposed development is DRI: (1) administratively-developed "stan-
dards and guidelines" that create presumptions of regional impact and
(2) a process by which a doubtful developer can apply to the state land
planning agency for a binding determination within the legislative defi-
nition.02 The legislature must "approve" revisions to the standards and
guidelines.0 3
The Courts Have Their Say
California courts have traditionally been solicitous of government's
efforts to regulate land use. As put by a leading commentator: "[t]he
striking feature of California zoning law is that the courts in that state
have quite consistently been far rougher on the property rights of devel-
opers than those in any other state.""° Given this willingness to tolerate
restrictions, the California coastal programs unsurprisingly have incurred
virtually no state judicial hostility. 5
Many Florida judges may prove to have a quite different philosophy
from that of most California judges. In Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, '"
the first Land and Water Management Act case to reach the Florida
Supreme Court, the court invalidated the Act's delegation of power to
the governor and cabinet for designating particular areas of critical state
concern. The standards for exercise of the power were held inadequate
and unconstitutional under the separation of powers section of the Florida
Constitution. In reaching its decision, the court expressly refused to adopt
100. FLA. STAT. ANN. §380.06(1 1) (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
101. Id. § 380.06(1).
102. Id. §§380.06(2)(a), 380.06(4)(a).
103. Id. §380.06(2)(a).
104. N. WI.LAMS JR., AMERIcAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 6.03, at
115 (1974).
105. See generally Calif. CLM, supra note 57.
106. 372 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
January 1985]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
a more liberal view of delegation applied at the federal level"°7 and by a
substantial minority of state courts."0 8 It refused to apply standards vir-
tually identical to those recommended by the American Law Institute for
its similar process in the Model Land Development Code."° The court
also expressly rejected a theory of delegation espoused by leading ad-
ministrative law scholars."10
The major weakness of the Cross Key opinion is its failure to articulate
all the policy reasons that undoubtedly supported ihe court's judgment. "
Rather than carefully discussing all the competing values and arguments
underlying the profound choice before the court, the decision was ex-
plained as one compelled by a unique, restrictive provision in the Florida
107. Two important exceptions to the United States Supreme Court's tendency to uphold congres-
sional delegations are A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). For subsequent decisions upholding broad dele-
gations, see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742
(1948); and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). For three cases (out of "perhaps three
hundred cases") in which Davis believes "the whole policy of the government on the particular
subject was made by the agency without guidance from Congress," see K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE, § 2.00, at 40 (Supp. 1970). See also W. GE.LHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw:
CASES AND COMMENTS 71-84 (6th ed. 1974) ("the steady course of Supreme Court decisions since
the Panama Refining and Schechter cases underscores the improbability that a federal statute reg-
ulating business practices and not affecting freedom of expression will be found defective on the
ground that it violates the delegation doctrine."
108. For recent state supreme court decisions that have adopted the position that procedural
safeguards, including the formulation of subsidiary administrative standards, are more important
than insisting on precise legislative standards, see, e.g., Boehl v. Sabre Jet Room, Inc., 349 P.2d
585 (Alaska 1960); Barry & Barry, Inc., v. State Dep't. of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash. 2d 155, 500
P.2d 540 (1972), appeal dismissed, 410 U.S. 977 (1973); Watchmaking Examining Bd. v. Husar,
49 Wis. 2d 526, 182 N.W.2d 257 (1971). See also Cross Key Waterways v. Askew, 372 So.2d 913
(Fla. 1978), and cases cited therein. Notwithstanding the liberalization of the doctrine in many state
courts, it has retained considerable vitality in others. See generally F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw (1965); GELLHORN & BYsE, supra note 107 at 34; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL oFADMINISTRATIVE
AcTnON 73-85 (abridged ed. 1965); Note, Safeguards, Standards, and Necessity: Permissible Pa-
rameters for Legislative Delegations in Iowa, Statutes Delegating Legislative Power Need Not
Prescribe Standards 14 STAN. L. REV. 372 (1962).
109. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 7-201 (1975).
110. Professor Davis maintains that there should be a shift in emphasis from legislatively
imposed standards for administrative action to procedural safeguards in the admin-
istrative process. He supports his rationale by citation to federal decisions as well
as decisions from a minority of state court jurisdictions. His premises are that (1)
strict adherence to the nondelegation doctrine would stultify the administrative pro-
cess; (2) the doctrine, in fact, has been used as a label to invalidate legislation of
which courts disapprove without any rational distinction between standards approved
and those disapproved; and (3) the danger of arbitrary or capricious administrtive
action is best met through procedural due process safeguards in the administrative
process. Although the Davis view is an entirely reasonable one as demonstrated by
its adoption in the federal courts and a minority of state jurisdictions, nonetheless,
it clearly has not been the view in Florida.
372 So.2d 913, at 922-23 (Sundberg, J.).
Ill. The author's criticism of Cross Key Waterways is elaborated in Florida CLM, supra note
69, at 349-57.
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Constitution. 2 Although the court's holding was unquestionably within
its power, it acknowledged that similar language in other state constitu-
tions had been interpreted differently." 3
The lower court's opinion in Cross Key was much more candid in
exposing that court's philosophical preference. The judge explained:
[The Act ... shifts ultimate regulatory authority from the county
courthouse and city hall to the Capital. The Act thus touches sen-
sibilities as old as the Revolution itself, because it affects the right
of access to govemment-'the right of the people effectively to
instruct their representatives, and to petition for redress of griev-
ances'-on which other cherished rights ultimately depend. The pri-
macy of local government jurisdiction in land development regulation
has traditionally been, in this country, a corollary of the people's
right of access to government. In a sense, therefore, the jurisdictional
claim of local governments in these matters is based on historical
preferences stronger than law.' "'
Ironically, Florida's critical area process and Article 7 of the ALI Code
(on which Florida's act was patterned) are excellent models for promoting
the "primacy of local government jurisdiction in land development reg-
ulation." " 5 During the 1970s, the Florida legislature undoubtedly sensed,
even if Florida's courts did not, that significant pressures were building
to shift a significant degree of land planning and regulation to higher
levels of government. Florida's FLWMA is a sensible compromise be-
tween localism and centralism. It will be an unfortunate usurpation of
legislative prerogative if the Florida judiciary utilizes the nondelegation
112. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3: "The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative,
executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."
113. 372 So.2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978). 114. 351 So.2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. App. 1977).
114. 351 So.2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. App. 1977).
115. Id. The Commentary to the tentative draft of Article 7 of the ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT
CODE, on which Florida's Land and Water Management Act was patterned, explained that
at least 90 percent of the land use decisions currently being made by local govern-
ments have no major effect on the state or national interest ... The Reporters have
tried, therefore, to balance the need for expanded state participation in the control
of land use against a policy that this participation be directed toward only those
decisions involving important state or regional interests, while retaining local control
over the great majority of matters which are only of local concern.
MODEL LAND DEv. CODE at 5 (Tent. Draft no. 3, 1971). Dr. John DeGrove was chairman of the
gubernatorial Task Force on Resource Management that produced and recommended enactment of
what became Florida's Land and Water Management Act. The author of this article was chairman
of the Task Force's land use subcommittee. Legislative history of the major consideration to the
continuing primary role of local governments is recorded in DEGROVE, supra note 91, 106-16; Florida
CLM, supra note 69, at 335-39; and Finnell, Saving Paradise: The Florida Environmental Land
and Water Management Act of 1972, 1973 URB. L. ANN. 103 ("At least five major policies tended
to be predominant during Task Force deliberations: (1) the land regulation power should remain as
close to those affected as possible; (2) large, centralized bureaucracy, with its concomitant imper-
sonality, should be avoided..." Id. at 114).
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doctrine to substitute its policy preferences for those of the legislature.
Several cases arising under the FLWMA reflect no perceptible judicial
hostility. Indeed, the court's opinion in General Development Corp. v.
Division of State Planning116 is exemplary in requiring better administra-
tive procedures and closer adherence to the legislative purposes of the
Development of Regional Impact (DRI) process.
The 1981 decision in Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.17 may also
signal a new sensitivity on the part of the Florida Supreme Court to
legislative efforts to protect Florida's natural resources. Estuary Prop-
erties was the first case to consider several complex issues that arise when
coastal wetlands are regulated pursuant to the DRI process. 8 The decision
is particularly important because it embraces, as part of Florida's "takings
clause" jurisprudence, the rationale of the important Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision in Just v. Marinette County."9 The Florida Supreme Court
noted the relevance of the public trust doctrine 20 and agreed with the
Wisconsin court that "[a]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited
right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it
for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which
injures the rights of others.1 1
STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE
The environmental and energy crises of the 1970s have resulted in
institutional reforms that may cause profound shifts in the balances of
power among national, state, and local governments. Although Congress
should not necessarily be constrained by the judicial policy preferences
reflected in the supremacy and commerce clause cases discussed above,
review of these judicially-derived criteria offers useful insights for eval-
uation of proper nation-state relationships in the field of coastal land
management. A checklist should contain the following questions:
(a) Does the federal regulatory program operate in a field thought
116. 353 So.2d 1199 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977).
117. 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
118. Other issues the Estuary Properties court decided were: (1) the Florida Land and Water
Management Act "requires a balancing of the interests of the state in protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of the public against the constitutionally protected private property interests of the
landowner." Id. at 1377; (2) the burdens of proof, Id. at 1378-79; and (3) procedural requirements
concerning changes in the development order which would make it possible for Estuary to receive
a permit, Id. at 1379-80.
119. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 871 (1972).
120. On the public trust doctrine, see, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892);
State v. Black River Phosphate Co., 32 Fla. 82, 13 So. 640 (1893). See generally Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interpretation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970).
121. 399 So.2d at 1382 (citing Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 201 N.W.2d 761,
768 (1972)).
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traditionally to be the regulatory responsibility of state and local
governments?
(b) If so, have the proponents of the federal program rebutted the
presumption that the activity or area regulated should remain exclu-
sively under state and local regulation?
(c) Does the activity or area regulated, by its nature, character,
location, or magnitude require uniform national regulation?
(d) Does the activity or area concerned require that the federal
government regulate because of the inability or unwillingness of the
state political processes to consider extrastate effects? Will affected
citizens of the United States be unfairly represented by relying solely
on state and local political and legal processes?
(e) Assuming federal regulation is needed, should it be exclusive
or concurrent with state and local programs?
(1) Would a state program in the same field "stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and the execution of the full purpose
and objectives"" of an important congressionally-enacted program?
(2) Is there an inevitable collision between the two schemes
of regulation?
(3) Does the subject demand exclusive federal regulation in
order to achieve uniformity necessary to national interests?"2
(4) Would state regulation of the subject unreasonably burden
interstate commerce? Even if the subject were a legitimate local
public interest, is it likely that the burden imposed on interstate
commerce would be excessive in relation to the local benefits?
(5) Assuming exclusive federal jurisdiction is not required, is
there need for a dual state-federal permit program, or could the
national interest be served as well by state or local regulation subject
to compliance with federal standards?
There are many reasons, of course, why Congress should be cautious
in deciding upon an appropriate federal role in coastal land management.
One reason relates to the federal judiciary's reluctance to be active in
zoning and other land use disputes. 24 Most land use decisions in the
coastal zone will have significant environmental, social, and economic
consequences affecting citizens from all socioeconomic groups located
over wide geographical areas. The courts are properly reluctant to sub-
stitute their judgments for those of policymakers in such a policy-laden
field."2 This judicial reluctance carries over even into quasi-judicial mat-
122. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
123. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
124. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n. v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
125. The courts' "legislative" categorization of many land use decisions (even small-tract re-
zonings), the "fairly debatable" rule, and the presumption of validity of legislative judgments are
primary judicial techniques for deferring to legislative judgments. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v.
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ters.'26 Thus, most impetus for experimentation and innovation in coastal
land management techniques will come from the political and legislative
processes.
Reliance on exclusive federal regulatory programs poses a danger be-
cause Congress is probably unable to carry the burden of experimentation,
amendment, and interstitial development of coastal land management
programs. The difference in local, regional, and state needs will be too
great. As a practical matter, there could be difficulty in even getting
congressional attention. Thus, preemptive federal programs ought to be
exceptional. A healthy federal system requires that state and local gov-
ernments have a major role in experimenting with innovative techniques
for meeting public needs in the coastal zone. Regional diversities will
more likely be reflected when regional political forces can be depended
upon to review and correct such experimental legislation.
The field of coastal land management, in contrast with regulation of
commercial watercourses or offshore areas, is still not well adapted to
the homogenizing effects of federal uniformity. Institutional arrangements
must be designed to meet the needs of the "public interest" at every level
of government. They must also contain dependable mechanisms for con-
tinuing review and correction. These goals require a dynamic, ongoing
legislative function at every level of government.
The California and Florida approaches are sound, even if implemen-
tation has often been sluggish and fine-tuning slow. Most large, diverse
coastal states should design programs providing for the strongest feasible
planning and regulatory role for local governments. More is at stake in
coastal land management than the intelligent use of coastal resources.
Accessibility and accountability of government to its citizens; promotion
of the values of localism, voluntarism, and diversity; encouragement of
private initiative and experimentation-these and other values are better
promoted by keeping coastal land use decisionmaking at the lowest fea-
sible level of government.
Clearly, some sensitive areas and major development activities require
centralized regulation. It would be foolhardy, for example, to leave final
decisions on the placement of major energy facilities, critical to the
AmblerRealty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See generallyR. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME: MUNICIPAL
PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1966).
Although a few state supreme courts have reconceptualized the small-tract rezoning, e.g., Snyder
v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 421, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975); City of Colorado Springs v.
District Court, 184 Colo. 177, 519 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1974); Aldon v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J.
Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (1956); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 524, 507 P.2d 23
(1973); other state supreme courts, e.g. Olley Valley Estates, Inc. v. Fussell, 232 Ga. 779, 208
S.E.2d 801 (1974), continue to follow the majority position that even a small-tract rezoning is a
legislative function.
126. Id.
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nation's security, to the unfettered discretion of the states. It would be
unwise to allow local governments the final word on how sensitive coastal
marshes are used.
Congress should specify significant national interests and adopt regu-
latory technique that will ensure that national goals and objectives are
met. The Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980 '27 enum-
erates several national policies. States are expected, for example, to
protect "natural resources, including wetlands, floodplains, estuaries,
beaches, dunes, barrier islands, coral reefs, and fish and wildlife in their
habitat....,,28 States are expected to protect life and property endan-
gered by "improper development in flood-prone, storm surge, geological
hazard, and erosion-prone areas and in areas of subsidence and saltwater
intrusion, and by the destruction of natural protective features such as
beaches, dunes, wetlands, and barrier islands."' 29
These and other national policies and goals 3 ' will not be achieved,
however, if the task is left entirely to state and local governments. The
nation's vital wetlands, for instance, were dangerously threatened until
the Army Corps of Engineers improved its wetlands protection programs
under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899"'s and under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.'32 Hazardous development of barrier
islands was exacerbated by federal policy until Congress, through the
Coastal Barrier Resources Act'33 and amendment to the national flood
insurance program' removed many of the subsidies and incentives that
have encouraged such destructive development.
The national government must have the final word on placement of
critical energy facilities and other projects having substantial effects upon
national security. But these decisions should be made within an institu-
tional context which ensures that the views of state and local governments
will be heard and considered. The federal consistency clauses 3' can work
well in this respect. Congress, however, should modify the CZMA in
response to the restrictive effects of the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Secretary of the Interior v. California.'36 The CZMA requires that
127. Pub. L. No. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060 (1980).
128. Id. at § 3 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(A) (1982)).
129. Id. at §3 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1451(2)(B) (1982)).
130. E.g., provisions relating to priority to coastal-dependent uses; siting of major facilities;
location of new development in or adjacent to areas where such development already exists; public
access to the coasts; redevelopment of deteriorating urban waterfronts and ports; management for
living marine resources.
131. U.S.C. §403 (1982). See generally Federal CLM, supra note 1, at 174-218.
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982). See generally Federal CLM, supra note 1, at 174-218.
133. Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (1982).
134. National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§4011-4028 (1982).
135. 16 U.S.C. § 1456 (1982).
136. -_ U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 656 (1984).
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particular activities be consistent with approved state management pro-
grams, but reserves for the secretary of commerce the power to override
a state's determination of inconsistency if the secretary finds that the
activity is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or is necessary in
the interest of national security.137
The federal consistency clauses have not caused serious delays or
significant impediments to federal licensing or development. California
is a major site for potential consistency disputes; nevertheless, a Senate
committee reported in 1980 that "[t]he record on OCS [outer continental
shelf] consistency certification in California was scrutinized in the hearing
and found to average 21 days.' 138
California has actively involved local governments in decisions on
offshore development. A working group composed of coastal commission
staff, Office of Planning and Research staff, and local government plan-
ners has sought "(1) [t]o plan for onshore impacts of offshore oil devel-
opment; (2) to make the forthcoming EIS more thorough; and (3) to
increase public awareness of OCVS development and encourage partic-
ipation in the leasing decisionmaking process.' ' 139 True, California's lit-
igation may delay some exploration off the California coast. It is essential,
however, to establish a decisionmaking process which responds to state
and local governments valid concerns about the potential onshore effects
of offshore oil exploration."o
EPILOGUE: RECENT PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Two other matters invite comment. The first involves California local
governments' relatively sluggish record in producing the required local
coastal programs (LCPs). The second concerns whether the multi-level
programs discussed in this paper will be adequately funded.
California's LCP certification process has been significantly slow. Cer-
tification was less than one-third complete by the July 1981 deadline; the
coastal commission's chief planner "hoped" that by January 1983, 75 to
80 percent of the LCPs would be certified. "' By August 1984, however,
the process was still far from complete. Facially, this record is disap-
pointing, and, concededly, this performance raises serious questions about
the feasibility of state and local collaborative coastal programs. The sta-
tistics do not reflect, however, all of the progress that has occurred. The
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(d) (1982).
138. S. REP. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980).
139. California Coastal Commission, Biennial Report 1979-80 23 (undated).
140. For a further discussion of Secretary ofInterior v. California see also Wolf, Accommodating
Tensions in the Coastal Zone:An Introduction and Overview, 25 NAT. REs. J. (1985).
141. Interview with Robert G. Brown, in San Francisco (May 18, 1981).
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program was innovative; there were virtually no models to emulate. 142
Thus, much time was consumed in identifying important coastal issues
and establishing procedures for hearing public views and reconciling
conflicts. 143 Local governments had experience only in adopting and for-
mulating plans under the general planning laws. The California Coastal
Act required that coastal land use plans and implementing ordinances
meet new and precise legislative requirements."
Moreover, the educational results are encouraging. The certification
process has sensitized local citizens to coastal management issues. Many
local governments have improved their capacities to respond to coastal
land management needs. 45 State planners now are more attuned to the
need for maximum cooperation and coordination with local planners and
officials. This knowledge can soon be translated into more and better
LCPs.
The California experience will be the nation's best test of whether a
strong local regulatory role will work because California local govern-
ments are regaining a strong voice in coastal land management. The six
regional coastal commissions automatically terminated on June 30, 198 1, "
resulting in a dramatic increase in the planning and regulatory burden on
the state coastal commission. This fact and the general mood favoring
less regulation led to amendments to the coastal act, for example, that
local governments be allowed to assume permit responsibility as soon as
their coastal land use plan (LUP) is approved. Normally the permit func-
tion is not transferred to the local governments until the LCP, including
implementing ordinances, is approved. 47
An additional matter that deserves careful attention is whether the
current political climate will produce adequate funding of multilevel pro-
grams. At the national level, for example, the CZMA grant-in-aid program
has been significantly curtailed. 141
The CZMA program would seem entirely consistent with at least one
142. For a discussion of the then existing models, see F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLES, THE QuET
REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROLS (1971). For Florida's reason for choosing article 7 of the ALl
MODEL LAND DaV. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, Apr. 1971) instead of an existing state model, see
Florida CLM, supra note 69, at 335-39.
143. Interviews with Robert G. Brown, in San Francisco (May 18, 1981 & Sept. 19, 1983).
144. Id.
145. Based on interviews in California (May 18-30, 1981 & Sept. 19, 1983).
146. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 30305 (West 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1984).
147. Id. §§30108.6, 30600(d).
148. For fiscal year 1982, the Carter Administration had proposed funding at the rate of $38
million for Section 306 grants and $30 million for the Coastal Energy Impact Program. The Reagan
Administration proposed zero budgets for both categories. In conference committee, the congressional
compromise was $33 million for Section 306 and $7 million for CEIP. Interview with James Murley,
Office of Coastal Zone Management, in Wash., D.C. (July 22, 1981).
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of the major premises of President Reagan's policies: that "our American
brand of federalism must be substantially modified because state and local
governments are inherently more equitable and efficient in their distri-
bution of public resources." 49 The program ran afoul, however, of an-
other of the Reagan premises: that "the primary villain in explaining
inflation is deficit federal spending." 15° Hence the President proposed, as
part of a substantial reduction of funding for the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, termination of the Coastal Energy Impact
Program (CEIP) and withdrawal of all federal grants to support state
management programs."' Eighty percent of the support of California's
LCP-certification process has come from federal funds.
152
California and Florida have had difficulties in implementing their coastal
land control systems. There is little reason, however, to assume that a
more centralized structure would have accomplished the same tasks more
effectively. Indeed, there is some evidence that the California Coastal
Commission has not performed well when requested to prepare an LCP
for a local government.153 If a federal agency were assigned to do the
fine-scale planning required for effective coastal land management, the
probability of failure would seem even greater.
Strong reliance on local government is not only sound public policy
but is virtually compelled by reasons of administrative feasibility. Land
use decisions require close scrutiny of conflicting environmental, social,
and economic values. Local governments should have a major voice-
although often not the final voice-in determining how these conflicts
are resolved.
State and local governments that resist the enactment and implemen-
tation of concurrent and cooperative regulatory programs are probably
doing themselves and their constituencies serious disservice. There may
be short-term political advantage in decrying state and federal interven-
tion, but that is not the kind of political statesmanship required if coastal
lands are to be managed in a sensible way. The ultimate question for
state and local governments is not whether they can retain most of their
149. Thomas R. Kostos, Legislative Analyst, committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S.
House of Representatives, The Implementation of Ocean Legislation in the Eighties: A Legislative
Perspective 7 (unpublished paper prepared for a seminar, "Future Directions in U.S. Marine Policies
in the 1980s," sponsored by the Hutchins Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in con-
junction with the Marine Policy Program of the University of California, Santa Barbara and the
Institute for Marine Resources at the University of California, San Diego, June 4-6, 1981).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 5.
152. Interview with Robert G. Brown, in San Francisco (May 18, 1981).
153. E.g. interview with Arnold S. Herskovic, senior planner, City of Eureka, California, in
Eureka (May 11, 1981); and inferences drawn from interview with Bob Lagle, Executive Director,
North Central Coast Regional Commission, in San Rafael, Cal. (May 26, 1981).
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regulatory authority in the coastal zone. Rather it is whether they can
keep any at all.
Congress should continue to fund the federal coastal zone program.
State coastal zone programs are still in their infancy and will require
federal support until they are more firmly established. If the state programs
work well, it will be easier to keep federal programs to a minimum. The
federal regulatory role can then be restricted to those issues such as
wetlands protection, or placement of critical energy facilities projects, in
which the states have shown an inability or unwillingness to promote
important national objectives.
GARCIA V. SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY' 54
On February 19, 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly overruled
National League of Cities v. Usery 55 The Court concluded that "the
attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of
'traditional government function' is not only unworkable but is incon-
sistent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those
very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported
to rest."
56
Justice Blackmun, writing for the five-person majority, emphasized
that "the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our system
provides through state participation in federal governmental action."' 57
The four dissenting justices deplored the "emasculation of the powers of
the States that can result from the Court's decision."' 58 Justice Rehnquist,
with surprising candor, predicted that a limiting principle such as National
League of Cities will "in time again command the support of a majority
of this Court." 159
A major premise of this article is that Congress can, if it chooses,
totally displace state and local governments in the management of critical
resources and activities in the coastal zone; the principal checks on na-
tional overreaching are the political checks inherent in the structure of
154. 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at D-13 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's dissenting opinion was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.
159. Id. at D-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's separate dissenting opinion,
joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, predicted similarly: "I would not shirk the duty acknowl-
edged by National League of Cities and its progeny, and I share JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S belief
that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility." Id. at D-18.
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the Constitution. 1" This premise was defensible during the nine-year
National League of Cities era; it seems virtually unassailable in the post
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority era.16
160. See supra notes, 9, 11-19, and accompanying text.
161. Presumably, all the justices would support this statement from the majority opinion: "Of
course we continue to recognize that the States occupy a special and specific position in our con-
stitutional system and that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect
that position." 53 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985). The dispute, of course, is whether "the
internal safeguards of the political process," id., are adequate or whether a limiting principle such
as National League of Cities is required. The four dissenting justices predict that National League
will yet be resurrected.
[Vol. 25
